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ESSAY
Unloved: Tort in the Modern
Legal Academy
John C. P. Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION
In The Idea of Private Law, Ernest Weinrib makes an arresting
claim. He says that private law-by which he means primarily the law
of contract, restitution, and especially tort-is "just like love."'
Even members of a discipline devoted to analogies may be
forgiven for not immediately perceiving the point of this one,
particularly if we focus on the private law of tort. Few law students
would mistake negligence, defamation, or battery for love, and if they
did, their professors might be concerned for their well-being. Likewise,
it is difficult to recall another law professor writing of love and tort in
the same breath, except perhaps in connection with the old causes of
action, now regaining some currency, for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation.
2
Still, it is a mark of a beautiful mind-and Professor Weinrib
has one-to be able to draw connections others have not thought to
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1983, Wesleyan University; M. Phil.
(Politics) 1985, University of Oxford; M.A. (Politics) 1989, Princeton University; J.D. 1991, New
York University. This essay was originally presented as a speech at Stetson University College of
Law. Thanks to Peter Lake for providing the occasion, and to the faculty and students of Stetson
for enduring the talk. Thanks also for helpful comments to: Mark Brandon, Lisa Bressman,
Curtis Bridgeman, Allison Marston Danner, Julie Faber, Homer Goldberg, Don Herzog, Richard
Nagareda, Erin O'Hara, Anthony Sebok, Elizabeth TeSelle, Ernest Weinrib, and Ben Zipursky.
It is especially worth noting in the context of an "Essay" of this sort that I alone bear
responsibility for its mistakes.
1. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6 (1995).
2. This is not to say that others have not drawn connections between love and law. See,
e.g., W.H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, in COLLECTED SHORTER POEMS, 1927-1957 154 (1967).
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draw. So it is worth pondering this comparison: In what way is tort
law "just like love," according to Weinrib?
His answer is that tort law is like love in that it cannot be
understood by reference to its purpose or function. To make this
assertion is not to deny that tort law has practical significance. Love,
after all, is of the utmost importance. Rather, it is to say that tort law
cannot be made intelligible by reference to the social functions it
happens to perform.3 We do not gain an appreciation of love by
describing it in terms of a function that it serves. Of course, one could
describe the phenomenon of love as, say, a practice that permits the
socially optimal allocation of scarce emotional resources. One could
even profitably describe it that way, although the profit would stem
from the ill-fittingness of the description: By exactly failing to capture
the phenomenon, it would thus teach us something important about it.
Similarly, says Weinrib, we should understand tort law not for
all the things it does, but for what it is. To invoke a different analogy,
tort to Weinrib resembles sport. The sports fan appreciates how the
rules, practices, and participants in a game like baseball or basketball
come together to create a distinctive enterprise. Yet he or she does not
ask what is the point or purpose of the sport. That issue is out of
bounds. Again, this is not to say that sport has no consequences.
Rather, it is to say that when trying to grasp sport-and so, by
analogy, when thinking about tort-we ought to strive to understand
it from the inside, as an internally intelligible practice without
reference to its social functions.
Weinrib attaches the label "formalism" to his provocative plea
for the exclusive validity of internal comprehension. This choice of
label is a further provocation, invoking deliberately the long-
discredited legacy of Langdell against the triumphant modern trinity
of functionalism, instrumentalism, and pragmatism. 4 Others have
criticized Weinrib's formalism,5 and I will do some of that as well. My
main purpose, however, is not to launch a frontal attack, but to
suggest that Weinrib's commitment to "formalism" reveals an
interesting fact about the status of tort law as a subject. Specifically, I
maintain that, notwithstanding its continued presence in the first-
year curriculum, tort is a department of the law that has fewer serious
champions than any comparable subdiscipline. In saying that tort is
3. WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 5-6.
4. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 48-57 (1998)
(discussing Langdellian formalism).
5. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261 (1996) (reviewing
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)).
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just like love, Weinrib unintentionally helps demonstrate a different
point: Tort law is unloved.
I.
To assert that tort law is unloved necessarily poses the
question: "by whom?" Here, I do not have in mind students. To most
1Ls at least, tort is just another one of those classes assigned to them
without their informed consent. Many of them will have had to endure
the thrice-tried suit over a classroom kick in Putney,6 the mysterious
algebra of Carroll Towing,7 and the flammable falling plank of
Polemis.8 So they may have reasons for not loving particular aspects of
tort. Still, even if not always held in affection, a course in torts, simply
by virtue of appearing on the first-year schedule, carries with it a
certain legitimacy. In this, it is at least on par with criminal law,
property, or civil procedure.
Nor do I have in mind the American lay public, which has more
of a love-hate relationship with tort. We tend to froth over accounts-
often distorted 9 -of hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars
changing hands over repainted BMWs 10 and spilled coffee.1" On the
other hand, many of us are apparently anxious to retain the right to
sue HMOs for negligent coverage decisions.1 2 More fundamentally, we
cannot really accept that, when it is one of "us"-instead of one of
"those" whiners who is the victim of a wrongdoing-the state need not
provide a means of individualized redress. The notions of
responsibility and recourse that undergird tort law remain an
unusually prominent feature of American political culture. Indeed,
with the exhaustion of the idea of "equality" that fueled the Civil
6. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
7. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
8. Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (Eng. C.A. 1921).
9. See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 6-8 (2001)
(discussing misleading accounts of the spilled-coffee case).
10. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (reversing as unconstitutionally
excessive a $4 million punitive damage award to a physician who purchased a BMW that the
distributor had surreptitiously repainted in part to cover cosmetic damage incurred while in
transport).
11. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 9, at 6.
12. The Public, Managed Care, and Consumer Protections, KAISER PUB. OPINION UPDATE
(Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Menlo Park, CA), Aug. 2001, at 2, at
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3172[PublicOpinionUpdate.pdf (noting that sixty-nine percent of
Americans support the right to sue managed care organizations for wrongful coverage decisions,
although eighty percent would place limits on recoveries for noneconomic losses).
15032002]
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Rights movement, "responsibility" has arguably become the dominant
trope through which Americans reason about justice. 13
Rather, the unlovers of tort whom I have in mind are those who
make it their business to think and write about the subject, namely
scholars of tort. Tort, I claim, is unloved by those who best know tort
law and tort theory. Familiarity, in this instance, has bred contempt,
or indifference, or various other dispositions not plausibly falling
within the description of love.
Tort scholars' distaste for their chosen subject is in some sense
understandable. What is to love about an area of law littered with lost
lives, broken bodies, distressed survivors, damaged and polluted
property, and destroyed reputations? Still, one must recall that,
notwithstanding its hideous visage, tort law was at one time admired,
or at least appreciated, by those who made it their business to study
it. Blackstone understood "tort"-civil remedial law-as a small piece
of what he took to be the gorgeous mosaic of the liberal state's complex
system of law. In his eyes, it provided the means by which individuals
could vindicate their rights against wrongful invasions by others.14
Just as the structure of English government-King, Parliament, and
common law-helped protect rights against official tyranny, so tort
defined and defended the right not to be battered, detained, defamed,
dispossessed or otherwise injured by others. Tort therefore helped
fulfill the social contract. Upon entering civilized society, individuals
give up their natural right to wreak vengeance on their wrongdoers in
13. This is equally true for political "liberals" and "conservatives." Frustrated with the
fading power of equality discourse, civil rights leaders, for example, have turned to the ideas of
responsibility and reparations in suing corporations for unjustly enriching themselves via the
institution of slavery. See, e.g., Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American
Reparations to Redirect America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002) (analyzing reparations
claims); Anthony J. Sebok, The Brooklyn Slavery Class Action: More Than Just a Political
Gambit, FINDLAW, Apr. 9, 2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20020409.html (same).
Conservatives, for their part, have invoked tort-like notions to undergird a relatively narrow
conception of both the substance of the right to Equal Protection, and of Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to implement that right. See, e.g., City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (stating that Congress's Section 5 power is essentially a
power to remedy past or continuing wrongs; hence, it must be employed in a manner
proportionate and congruent to the wrong it aims to redress or prevent); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995) (holding that race-based classifications in legislation
are permissible only to remedy injuries traceable to identifiable wrongful and discriminatory acts
by defendants). In a forthcoming article, Rebecca Brown argues that the right to liberty,
overshadowed in the mid-twentieth century by the concept of equality, is now reemerging at the
center of current constitutional jurisprudence. Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty: The New Equality, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2002). The development she charts is in some sense the flip
side of what I am describing, namely the reemergence of the individual qua rights-bearer and
responsible agent as the focal point of modern thinking about justice.
14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55-56, 120-37
(facsimile ed. 1979) (1765-69).
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exchange for the positive legal power to invoke the apparatus of the
state to obtain legal redress from them.
Blackstone's understanding of tort appears to have remained
the conventional wisdom on both sides of the Atlantic for the next
hundred years. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however,
a new champion for American tort law emerged in the person of
Holmes. Holmes was the first modern theorist of tort.15 As such, he
15. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2001). Grey's
article makes three claims. First, he notes that nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurists
disagreed on whether to treat "tort" as a department of substantive law unto itself, or as a part of
civil procedure and/or remedies. Id. at 1226-27. Second, he maintains that Holmes was largely
responsible for establishing tort's modern status as a substantive subject. Id. at 1227. Third, he
argues that Holmes accomplished this task by building the category of tort around the emerging
welter of accident cases. Id. Thus, Grey suggests that Holmes's achievement was to render tort
law as co-extensive with accident law, thereby defining tort, in contrast to criminal law, as the
department of law through which the state regulates and responds to the lesser form of
antisocial conduct characteristic of accidents, namely fault (the failure to meet the objective
reasonable person standard). Id. at 1256-58.
These historical claims hint at a fourth claim that is more normative than historical. On
Grey's account, tort sports an unimpressive--accidental-pedigree. Moreover, its original and
only claim to coherence is as a scheme for deterring accidents and compensating accident
victims. Given tort's unimpressive lineage, and that we can now attend to the costs of accidents
through arguably more rational systems of administrative regulation and insurance, Grey's
analysis at least suggests that tort deserves to be treated as a second-class citizen among modern
departments of law.
Grey's article is an important contribution to the history of tort law. However, it may give a
misleading impression of what was at stake in the nineteenth-century debates, and of what
Holmes had in mind.
Nineteenth-century disputes over whether tort was best described as remedial or substantive
were not disputes about the purpose or usefulness of the tort causes of action. It was no slight to
the actions for trespass and trespass on the case to describe them as part of procedural or
remedial law. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 55-56 ("For in vain would rights be declared, in
vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights,
when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the
protection of the law."). Moreover, a somewhat different appreciation of the importance of
remedial law was the foundation for Holmes's famous change of heart about tort's status as a
subject. As Grey notes, in 1871, Holmes declared torts "not a proper subject" because it was
merely a collection of remedial writs rather than a coherent body of law. Grey, supra, at 1232.
Yet in 1873, Holmes published an essay entitled "The Theory of Torts." Id. What explains the
change? The answer may lie in Holmes's increasing enchantment with the prediction theory of
law, about which he first seems to have written in the intervening year of 1872. See OLIVER W.
HOLMES, JR., Book Notice, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872), reprinted in FREDERIC R. KELLOGG,
THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
91, 92 (1984) ('The only question for the lawyer is, how will the judges act?").
In the 1873 essay, Holmes notes that the "worst" objection to treating torts as a subject is
that to do so would be to put the "cart before the horse," and "the substantive under the adjective
law." Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 652-54 (1873), reprinted in
KELLOGG, supra, at 117-124. Why is this the "worst" objection? Because, under the prediction
theory, remedy defines right. One can only know what the law is by knowing when one will be
sanctioned by a court for one's conduct, and that in turn requires one to know when a claim of
trespass or case will succeed. In short, those who identified torts as a subject were on the
jurisprudential cutting edge: They understood that substance always reduces to remedy. Id. at
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1501
presided over its reorientation around the tort of negligence, as well as
its corresponding elevation to the status of a major department of the
law. (Admittedly, it is a bit of a stretch to describe Holmes as a lover of
tort, for he seems not to have been a lover of anything or anyone. Let
us say, then, that he mustered at least as much affection for tort as for
anything else in his life.)
16
From Holmes, the torch was passed next to members of the
ensuing generation, including most prominently Francis Bohlen and
Benjamin Cardozo. Both men devoted themselves to recrafting the
common law of tort to better fit the new age of industrial and
motorized vehicle accidents. 17 Cardozo, in particular, saw in the
concepts and byways of the common law all the resources necessary to
adapt Blackstone's law of private redress to the wrongs perpetrated by
railroad owners, automobile drivers, and product manufacturers.
1 8
Yet if tort continued to enjoy a certain buoyancy into the early
years of the twentieth century, the seeds of its fall from grace were
being planted at the same time. Even as Holmes was developing his
theory of tort, tort law was being called upon to do something it had
never been asked to do before: handle a major economic, social and
political problem, namely the phenomenon of mechanized accidents,
124-25 ("[A]n enumeration of the actions which have been successful, and of those which have
failed, defines the extent of the primary duties imposed by the law .. "). Of course, in The
Common Law, Holmes would go on to assert that, upon studying the various tort causes of
action, one could induce that (almost) all of them turned on the same liability standard: objective
fault. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94-5 (1881). But that inductive claim was not a
basis for distinguishing tort from other departments of law. Quite the opposite, Holmes in the
same book asserted that criminal liability, like tort liability, also turned on the objective
negligence standard. Id. at 51. Instead, he held to the (conventional) view that the primary
difference between tort and crime is at the level of remedy. Criminal law sanctions unreasonable
acts through punishment, whereas tort law sanctions actors by ordering them to compensate for
harms caused by their unreasonable acts. Id. at 46, 79. (Also conventionally, Holmes
distinguished contract as concerned with liability arising from voluntary undertakings, as
opposed to those imposed by the state). Id. at 77.
This perspective on the nineteenth-century debates, and Holmes's contribution to them,
removes much of the implicit normative sting of Grey's account. To the extent modern tort can
trace its status as a freestanding department of the law to the work of Holmes, it is not rightly
characterized as having been originally conceived as "mere" accident law, i.e., a primitive device
fortuitously constructed by judges for deterring and redistributing the cost of accidents.
16. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1977); see also ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 31-40
(2000) (suggesting that Holmes was self-absorbed, aloof, detached, uncharitable, and unhappy,
albeit an excellent correspondent).
17. See George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 465-68 (1985).
18. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1455-74 (1999)
(review article) (arguing that Cardozo elaborated, rather than deconstructed, tort concepts to
adjust law pragmatically to changing economic and social conditions).
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particularly workplace accidents. 19 In the eyes of many, tort failed this
test quite miserably. Too many businesses employed shamelessly
unsafe practices; too many maimed workers were left without redress;
too many widows and orphans were left without support. At best, tort
had proved itself unable to cope with the problems posed by a central
feature of the industrial world. At worst, it was-as Charles Gregory
and Morton Horwitz would later suggest2 0-a mere handmaiden of
capital.
21
Note how closely the widespread dissatisfaction with tort
paralleled the simultaneously emerging general lawyerly and
academic disposition against the jurisprudence of constitutional
rights.22 Just as tort failed to protect workers and their families, so,
too, did constitutional law fail them by barring ameliorative
legislation. The same sort of thinking that led judges to throw out
causes of action under the fellow-servant rule simultaneously led them
to strike down industrial reform legislation as violating the due
process rights of employers. By observing this parallel, we can now
better appreciate why the progressive lawyer-scholars of this era were
probably less upset with Lochner v. New York 23 than with the New
York Court of Appeals' 1911 decision in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway
Co.,24 in which the court partially struck down on due process grounds
a workers' compensation scheme meant to replace the deficient law of
negligence. Ives presented the apogee of anti-progressive law:
regressive constitutional law invoked to protect regressive tort law.
For his part, Holmes, now sitting as a Supreme Court Justice,
was not particularly fazed by the progressive critique of tort's
handling of workplace accidents. Nor is this surprising, for not only
did he hold tort in affection, but he also disliked progressives. 25 Thus,
19. See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort
Law and the Cooperative First Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 691, 726-66 (2001)
(describing the pressure put on tort in the post-Civil War period by the rise of workplace
accidents).
20. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 85-99
(1977); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 361-
70 (1951).
21. My point is not that, once industrialization occurred, tort's individualized inquiry into
wrongdoing and responsibility was rendered irrelevant. Rather, I am noting the contingent
historical fact that industrial and mechanized accidents first posed the question of whether
government should respond to accidents, or certain types of accidents, by supplementing or
supplanting tort with an actuarially-based insurance scheme.
22. See generally John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998) (elaborating on this parallelism).
23. 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
24. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
25. See supra note 16 (referencing Gilmore's evaluation of Holmes).
2002] 1507
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he found himself in a potentially uncomfortable position when the
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases came to the Court in 1919.26 These
cases posed at the federal level the same issue that Ives had presented
at the state level: whether there is any constitutional bar to legislation
partially supplanting the common law of negligence with a no-fault
workers' compensation scheme. In his previous incarnation as lawyer-
theorist, Holmes had invested a decade's worth of historical research
and analytic argument to prove that the negligence standard is the
only standard of liability compatible with liberal principles of
government, and that strict liability ought to be eliminated as running
counter to those principles. 27 Given this effort, and his disdain for
progressivism, one might have predicted that Holmes would conclude
that these principles, incorporated into the U.S. Constitution through
the Due Process Clause, barred no-fault liability in workers'
compensation. Yet here Holmes's commitment to "judicial restraint"
trumped his commitment to tort. "There is some argument," he noted,
"for the general proposition that immunity from liability when not in
fault is a right inherent in free government. . . ." "But," he continued,
"if it is thought to be public policy to put certain voluntary conduct at
the peril of those pursuing it, whether in the interest of safety or upon
economic or other grounds, I know of nothing to hinder."28 In other
words, the common law of negligence is the expression of liberal
principles, and is to be admired for that, but if the legislatures want to
go ahead and behave in the manner of mush-minded, illiberal
redistributivists, that is their business.
29
Bohlen and Cardozo, in contrast to Holmes, were more
progressive in disposition. Yet, each was a bit complacent in thinking
that the damage to tort's reputation flowing from its failure to handle
industrial accidents could be contained. 30 Bohlen, in fact, helped lead
the charge for replacement of tort in this area with workers'
compensation schemes.31  However, he did so only on the
understanding that this was the one necessary exception to the
26. 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
27. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 22, at 1753-56 (outlining Holmes's liberal theory of
tort).
28. 250 U.S. at 431-32 (Holmes, J., concurring).
29. I do not mean to imply that Holmes was wrong or inconsistent in adopting this position
on the issue of workers' compensation. To love tort is not to idealize or idolize it, but to recognize
that it brings something distinctive to the table, and hence ought not to be cast aside without a
clear-eyed view of what is being lost and gained by replacing it.
30. See Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372,
378 (1939) (noting that Cardozo was content to work within, rather than question, the common-
law tort paradigm).
31. See Priest, supra note 17, at 466-67 (offering this account of Bohlen).
[Vol. 55:15011508
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otherwise still coherent and admirably useful common law of tort. The
leading scholars of the next generation would conclude otherwise.
II.
The period from roughly 1930 to 1970 saw the emergence for
the first time of an extended community of professional tort scholars
and, with it, the establishment of two main lines of tort scholarship.
Both, I will suggest, drank deeply of the progressive critique of tort. As
a result, both demonstrated unlove for tort, although in very different
ways.
This claim is easiest to establish with respect to the first line of
scholars, which included the likes of Fleming James and Albert
Ehrenzweig, because these scholars explicitly condemned tort.32 The
lesson they took from tort's sorry record in handling workplace
accidents was simple: Tort is slow, expensive, and arbitrary in doling
out needed relief to victims, who were usually blue-collar workers and
their families. The same would hold true for tort applied to any large-
scale phenomenon, including automobile accidents and the production
and distribution of consumer products. For these scholars, there was
no reason for tort to govern any area of accident law and every reason
to get rid of it. And so it was that tort became unloved in the eyes of
one group of leading scholars in the field, a group whose latter-day
descendants include such distinguished scholars as Mark Franklin
and Jeffrey O'Connell. 33
The second line of torts scholarship that emerged in this era
was led by the decanal duo of Leon Green and William Prosser.34 Here
my claim will take more work to establish. Prosser, after all, made it
his life's work to advise lawyers and the judiciary-through his
32. Id. at 470-83 (providing the classic account of James's critique of tort); see also WALTER
J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS 3-8 (1965) (identifying numerous compensation theorists critical of tort's
handling of auto accidents).
33. Judge (then-Professor) Calabresi, heir in some ways to the Jamesian tradition, briefly
entertained the idea that tort might be worthy of his attentions. He fairly quickly concluded,
however, that he could never love a body of law so fixated on the backward-looking issue of
causation and so inattentive to the forward-looking issue of efficient deterrence. See Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 69, 85 (1975). It remains to be seen whether, as a judge, he will sculpt tort into the sort of
efficient regime of accident deterrence that he could love. See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d
264, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J.) (holding that the plaintiff in a failure-to-warn case need
not prove that the warning would have caused him not to be injured).
34. See generally LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1st ed. 1965) (collec-




treatise, his casebook, and his Restatement-that tort could be
modernized to handle new problems and new policies. If this
commitment does not count for love of a department of the law, what
does?
Yet Prosser, Green, and their intellectual heirs never loved tort
law for what it is. They loved it only for the power it creates: not only
power in judges and juries, but also power in the armchair
policymakers (law professors) who would advise them. In other words,
they were fully prepared to exploit tort law, but exploitation is surely
not to be mistaken for love. To take up with tort was to marry into
power and gain the ear of princes.
The fundamental virtue of tort for Prosser, Green, and their
intellectual descendants is not its content-indeed, as we will see, it
was vital to them that tort have minimal content-but rather its
ability to confer jurisdiction. The tort of negligence, in particular,
presented itself to them as a golden ticket, a blank check. Lots of
behavior, they realized, might be described as negligent, particularly,
in hindsight, after someone's been hurt. This realization not only
stemmed from the tractability of- the concepts of fault and
reasonableness, but also was predicated upon an important fact about
American political culture, which is that we simply do not cotton to
notions of fate. To us, every accident has an explanation, every bad
outcome a responsible party. Europeans and other strange peoples
might think in terms of systemic failures and unavoidable accidents.
Not so for us.
So negligence was there, waiting in the wings, ready to vest
judges and juries with jurisdiction to address all manner of social
problems. Yet its reach remained bounded by a set of restraining
concepts under which judges-even progressive judges like Cardozo-
continued to operate: concepts such as duty, reasonableness,
proximate causation, and contributory negligence. And so, invoking
the mantra of "Realism," Prosser and Green proceeded to gut each of
these restraining concepts of their content. By the mid-1950s, the
project was well under way. Thus, in his famous Cooley lectures,
Prosser brazenly declared that "the law [of negligence], "like the
Constitution, is what we make it."35 (Note the complicity between
scholar and judges implicit in this use of "we"!) Breach and proximate
cause, Green had already concluded, are what "we" say they are. 3
6
35. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953).
36. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 195-201 (1927) (arguing that the
inquiry often conducted under the guise of "proximate cause" is a policy determination to be
made by judges as to whether liability should or should not attach in a given instance of harm-
[Vol. 55:15011510
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Tort law is not a substantive body of law, he concluded, but merely a
process of decisionmaking.
37
Emptied of content and potentially applicable to all manner of
conduct, the new negligence provided judges, juries, and law
professors with a mandate to undertake de novo "social engineering." 38
The hope was that, having been freed of the conceptual constraints
that once caused them to render pro-capital, anti-plaintiff decisions,
these actors would set about reforming and expanding tort in a
decidedly progressive direction. Tort, according to this view, would
play an analogous role to the post-New Deal, pre-Lopez Commerce
Clause, which empowered Congress to enact pretty much any
legislation for which two majorities and a presidential signature could
be mustered.39 Negligence suits were no longer to be understood as
"cases or controversies" raising Blackstone's issues of responsibility
and redress. Rather, they provide occasions for judges and juries to
legislate or regulate. This observation is the upshot of Green's claim
that tort law is "public law in disguise."
40
The Prosser-Green vision has, of course, predominated. For a
contemporary example, consider the argument of Professors Koenig
and Rustad in a recent book, somewhat ironically entitled In Defense
of Tort Law.41 Tort law, they note, is nominally a system for providing
redress to those injured by the wrongs of others. But that is not the
basis on which it is to be defended. Rather, it is to be defended for its
"latent" public policy function, namely, "furthering the cause of social
justice" by uncovering and punishing corporate misconduct.42 In short,
tort law is embraced not for what it is, but for what it empowers
judges and juries and right-thinking legal policy analysts to do.
In describing Prosserians and Greenians as exploiters of tort
law, I do not mean to suggest that their work was or is without
virtues. Prosser, Green, and their heirs have contributed mightily to
the advancement of the law. 43 And each of them sincerely believed or
producing conduct); Leon Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032, 1044 (1928)
(arguing that breach or unreasonableness is what a given jury says it is).
37. See GREEN, supra note 34.
38. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 3, at 15 (title of third section of hornbook).
39. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 816 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing the breadth of the commerce power).
40. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise (Parts I & II), 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 257
(1959 & 1960).
41. See KOENIG AND RUSTAD, supra note 9. Perhaps a better title would have been The
Political Usefulness of Tort Law.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Thus, the California Supreme Court, liberated by Prosserian Realism, modernized
many antiquated doctrines pertaining to social-host liability, charitable immunity, etc. See, e.g.,
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believes that judges and juries ought to use the power conferred by
negligence to legislate wisely, in the name of public policy and the
public good. The problem with which I am concerned is instead that
their conception of negligence qua enabling act has presented judges
and juries with power largely unbounded by legal or institutional
constraints. Of course, each of these scholars desires and expects
judges and juries to use this power wisely, and they have tirelessly
advised them how to do so. But in this, the Prosserians are not wholly
dissimilar to the Divine Right theorists of the early seventeenth
century-the ones who argued with sincerity that James the First's
possession of absolute power should be of no great concern to the
citizenry, as he would of course be mindful of the common good in his
decisionmaking.
44
Finally, lest the foregoing statements be taken for an attack on
the liberal politics of Koenig and Rustad (or Green and Prosser), let
me be clear in disavowing that claim. The present meditation on love
and torts should not be misconstrued as an "Ode to Tort Reform." I
could just as easily level the criticism of Prosser at a conservative
Realist such as Judge Posner. Posner, no less than Prosser-in fact
more so, because he is a judge-exploits tort for its jurisdiction, not its
content. If, for Koenig and Rustad, the great thing about tort is that it
permits judges and juries to adopt the role of unappointed corporate
ombudsmen, for Posner the great thing about tort is that it permits
judges to act as roving efficiency commissioners charged with the task
of identifying and achieving the cost-efficient mix of precaution and
injury.45 In fact, one of the great ironies of Koenig and Rustad's
"defense" of tort law is that it plays directly into the hands of the tort
reformers whose cause they seek to defeat. Victor Schwartz, a lawyer
at the forefront of the modern movement to kill, or at least
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563-68 (Cal. 1968) (in bank) (employing Prosserian-duty
analysis to eliminate traditional plaintiff status categories in premises liability cases). This is
not, however, to say that Prosserian Realism was necessary to the introduction of those changes,
or even the best way to achieve them-simply that it did so.
44. See J. P. SOMMERVILLE, ROYALISTS AND PATRIOTS: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND
1603-1640 39 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that theorists of absolutism argued that the King's extralegal
obligations to God and his people would suffice to restrain him from tyrannical acts).
45. I take this to be the clear implication of Posner's rejection of the idea that law and moral
principles constrain adjudication, his corresponding overt embrace of open-ended, policy-based
judicial decisionmaking, and his belief that aggregate efficiency is, at a minimum, the prime
policy consideration to which he (and presumably other judges) attends and should attend. See
Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 78, 88-89 (describing
Posner's disbelief in the existence of legal and moral constraints on judges' decisions); Richard A.
Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99, 103-11 (D. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that persons of otherwise
divergent views can subscribe to an account of tort law as promoting wealth-maximization).
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substantially curtail, tort-a movement with very different
aspirations than the kill-tort movement of the early twentieth
century-is only too delighted to argue about the worth of tort as an
instrument for social engineering. 46 If that is all it is good for, then it
is hard to gainsay his point that democratically elected legislatures
and expert regulators should be permitted to reengineer the world to
make it safer for corporate America. 47
III.
Tort law, I have suggested, is not at all loved by compensation
theorists such as Fleming James or Jeffrey O'Connell, who have
steadily called for its elimination in favor of no-fault schemes. Nor is it
loved by mainstream Prosserian Realists, who value tort only in a
calculating way. Still, there is another major, camp of tort scholars
that we must consider, namely the corrective justice theorists. And
here we will eventually wend our way to Weinrib and his claim that
tort law is "just like love." Before doing so, however, we may profitably
pause to note the views of two other scholars who have been affiliated
with the corrective justice camp, Richard Epstein and Jules Coleman.
In the early 1970s, Epstein emerged as, in some respects, the
leading suitor of tort. At a time when automobile no-fault schemes and
strict products liability seemed to be pointing toward the eventual
replacement of tort with a New Zealand-style accident fund, Epstein
boldly proclaimed that tort law could and should be defended for
articulating, through law, moral notions of individual liberty and
responsibility reflected in everyday usage of the concept of causation.
48
In this regard, he seemed poised. to take on the mantle of Harry
Kalven, Jr., an earlier corrective justice theorist, and one of the
authors of the casebook Epstein would later inherit.49
Alas, Epstein's love of tort never really blossomed because,
from the outset, he placed on it the most stringent demands as a
condition of it receiving his affections. First, tort had to relinquish its
46. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform in
1997: History and Public Policy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L. REV. 595 (1997).
47. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 732-36 (2001) (noting that being a
Realist these days may play into the hands of tort reformers).
48. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 166-89, 200-04
(1973).
49. See CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (2d
ed. 1969); BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 32, at 56 (suggesting that tort is concerned with
"corrective" rather than distributive justice). Epstein joined as a coauthor on the third edition in
1974. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS xxv (7th ed. 2000).
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favorite modern pastime-negligence. 50 If tort was to live up to
Epstein's ideals, it had to come in the form of strict liability, for only
strict liability expressed the notions of causation and responsibility
that Epstein found embedded in our ordinary language. Second, and
somewhat gallingly, tort could earn his affection only by dressing up
as its older sibling, property, for property is what tells us when a bad
outcome must be transferred, via a compensatory payment, from
victim to tortfeasor. 51 Third, and more gallingly, tort had to know its
proper place. Specifically, it was required to lie low whenever contract
might be at hand to set the terms of the relationship between the
parties. 5
2
Professor Coleman's intellectual journey in the field of
corrective justice is revealing in a different way. His initial project was
to explain why a New Zealand-style system-in which general
revenues pay for an injury fund from which accident victims can
receive payment without identifying a responsible tortfeasor-was no
more or less an instantiation of justice than a system of tort liability.
Each system, he argued, was compatible with an "annulment"
conception of corrective justice. 53 Soon, however, Coleman reversed
course, coming to the view that a New Zealand system would not be
faithful to the idea of corrective justice, precisely because it does not
attempt to assign responsibility to individual wrongdoers to repair
their wrongs.
54
One might have expected Coleman's conclusion that tort law
enjoys a unique status as a practice of corrective justice to entail a
corresponding embrace of that practice. Yet Coleman still maintains a
cool distance, although in a different way than in his earlier work.
True, tort is more or less intelligible as a system that embodies the
principle of corrective justice. But that does not mean that corrective
justice is the sort of value, or tort the sort of system, we want to
endorse. Maybe we should employ the New Zealand system after all:
not because it achieves corrective justice, but because it might be the
50. See Epstein, supra note 48 (arguing for a regime of strict liability).
51. See Jules L. Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91,
102 (1995) (analyzing the central role within libertarian tort theory played by the idea of actors
"owning" good and bad outcomes).
52. See Richard A. Epstein, The Economics of Tort Law: A Hurried and Partial Overview, 10
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 60, 72 (2000) (urging judges presiding over tort suits to ask themselves,
"Why isn't this a freedom of contract issue?").
53. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349
365-66 (1992).




case that our legal system would be better if it never aspired to
achieve corrective justice.
55
My point is not to accuse Coleman of inconsistency. One can
argue for a particular understanding of an area of law such as tort
without being committed to justifying it. Rather, it is to note that the
later Coleman, armed with a deep and subtle appreciation of tort as a
practice tied to a conception of justice, is no less anxious than the
early Coleman to avoid embracing tort. Even as he now gingerly
embraces tort, Coleman is looking past it, eyeing New Zealand,
wondering whether we ought to be there instead.
And so back to Weinrib. As we have seen, he adopts a position
not wholly removed from Coleman's, although I will try to show now
that it is different in an important way. Tort law, he says, is just like
love. It is just like love because it is not to be understood for what it
does, only for what it is. What sort of attitude toward tort does this
claim bespeak?
Weinrib's analogy might suggest a Platonic argument for tort.
In this argument, there is no point to considering whether or not one
might choose to love tort; it is no less inevitable as part of the human
experience than gravity, or respiration, or ... well ... love. If, on this
reading of Weinrib, we were to personify tort law and ask it to justify
itself, its response might come from the pages of Exodus: "I am that I
am."
56
I doubt this sort of divine proclamation is what Weinrib has in
mind. In his view, if tort law personified were to declare its existence,
it would not invoke the overtones of omnipotence and inevitability
that attend the word of the Deity. Instead, it would sound more in the
blue-collar parlance of Popeye: "Iy'am what Iy'am," meaning, roughly,
"This is who I am, this is what I do." Tort law is a practice. It need not
exist. But it does exist, and its existence is best described in terms of
the features that render it an intelligible or coherent practice.
Suppose we grant that Weinrib is correct-as I think he is-to
argue that tort law is, or once was, a relatively coherent practice, and
that modern scholars have misunderstood tort by seeking to reduce its
content to the functions of deterrence and compensation. Does it follow
that there is nothing else to be said about tort law other than it holds
together as a practice that we happen to heed? Could we not say
instead that an adequate "formalist" understanding of the general
55. Most recently, Coleman seems to suggest that corrective justice comes near to collapsing
into distributive justice, in that it assigns duties to repair according to political principles that
set out to fairly distribute all the losses traceable to human conduct. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE




coherence of tort is a necessary first step to a broader, more
comprehensive analysis of tort? To trot out a deservedly well-worn
Holmesian aphorism, Weinrib may be entirely correct to argue that
sound legal analysis must begin by "getting the dragon out of the
cave," and that doing so requires formal analysis. However, once we
have roused the beast with our analytic poking, is it not incumbent
upon us to take up Holmes's second question: whether to tame or kill
it?51
Weinrib, in fact, seems reluctant to pose the second prong of
Holmes's two-part analysis. Perhaps he hesitates because he is
satisfied with the institution of tort law, so much so that he does not
see the point in questioning it. I doubt that; after all, he has published
an important article criticizing the common law's lack of a general
duty to take steps to effect easy rescues.58 Alternatively, his
quiescence may flow from a particular conception of the judicial role.
It may be that, in the end, what he is saying (here in direct opposition
to Prosser and Posner) is that judges are not authorized to do
anything other than understand and apply tort law as it is. 59 On this
reading, it is judges, and only judges, who must view tort like love, for
contained within their contract of employment (or implicit in the
definition of their office) is a commitment to apply the law rather than
legislate. By contrast, legislatures and legal scholars need not accept
the tort-love analogy, for they are not so bound. Weinrib's view of how
to understand tort would then perhaps better be described not as
formalism but as a cousin of Austinian positivism: one that conceives
of the judicial role as confined to following rules made by others.
Whatever its explanation, the point I wish to emphasize is that
Weinrib, in a manner not unlike Coleman, seems reticent about tort.
He asks us to think of tort as love, but does he love tort? Clearly, he
does not despise tort. Nor is he a calculating exploiter of tort. Nor does
he treat tort as the poor relation of property and contract. Nor is he
intrigued but unsure of his feelings toward tort. Indeed, Weinrib
seems quite steadfast in his faith in tort.
Still, it is a faith fueled more by fatalism than fervor.60 Just as
one is born a Jew or a Protestant, or born a Canadian or an American,
so one is born into the common-law system and the law of tort. Each of
us might have been born into a different religion, or in a different
country; we might even have chosen these different fates if given the
57. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
58. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
59. I owe this speculation to Ben Zipursky.
60. I owe this characterization to Tony Sebok.
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option. But we were not given that option and now there is nothing to
be done. (True, one can later opt to change religions or nationalities,
but it is not clear that doing so will rid oneself of various
characteristics connected with one's original identity.) Tort and its
underlying principle of corrective justice are ours; we are stuck with
them, and we are left to explain and understand them.
Weinrib's earnest fidelity to "our" tort law is powerful, almost
moving. But, still, I insist, it is not love. It is not love precisely because
of its fatalistic undertones. Weinrib says that we must attend to
corrective justice because we are who we are; we can do no other. In so
saying, he fails to capture the ineliminable aspirational aspect of love.
One cannot love something that one does not respect, admire, or
embrace, at least a little bit. A person or thing must contain at least a
shadow or flickering of the good before it can become the object of our
affection. It is not enough that he, she, or it is simply ours.
The ideal of justice is the highest aim of any legal system.
Thus, it is no accident that we find that aspiration etched into the
marble of the U.S. Supreme Court, and on the facades of scores of
American law schools. Weinrib, like Coleman, believes that tort law
embodies a conception of corrective justice. But that belief is carefully
expressed to be devoid of aspiration. So, I am led to ask: What sort of
justice is it that provokes so much reticence, so little enthusiasm? Not,
I submit, a form of justice that we love.
CONCLUSION
Generally among legal academics, tort law has been and is
disdained or exploited. Even those who might seem most inclined to
express love for tort turn out to hold it at arm's length, uncertain of
whether to embrace it or to endure it. Is there any other department of
the law subject to similar treatment at the hands of those who study
it? Are professors of contracts, or criminal law, or corporate law
similarly hostile or indifferent to their subject areas? My impression is
that they are not. To be sure, scholars in all fields make it their
business to point out the anomalies and dis-functionalities in the
law. 61 But are they busy disavowing their subjects generally? Do they
routinely entertain seriously the suggestion that contract, or criminal,
or corporate, or constitutional law ought not to exist?
What is it about tort that makes us, at a minimum,
discomfited? Does it still smack too much of crude vengeance? As a
61. Some scholars are unlovers of law, i.e., globally skeptical about 'substantive' law,
compared to the 'real' subjects of jurisdiction, process, and remedies. As these scholars have no
less love for tort than for criminal or constitutional law, I leave them to one side.
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subject, is it too grim, or too preposterous? My supposition is that
modern tort has become awkward for at least three reasons. First, we
have asked too much of it. As scholars too numerous to mention have
long noted, tort law is not well-suited to solve the large-scale social
and political problems it is being asked to solve (if only by default).62
The tort system, for example, is not a social insurance scheme, and if
it is the case that a wealthy society ought to have such a scheme as a
matter of justice, then we should adopt that scheme independently of
the tort system.6 3 Second, and relatedly, modern academics have
tended to gauge tort on a set of rigged criteria. Since Holmes's time,
pretty much the only question asked of tort has been: How well does it
deliver tangible goods such as a reduction in the number of accidents
or an increase in the number of injuries for which victims receive
compensation? By fiat, this question excludes consideration of the
intangibles that tort can deliver, such as the vindication of rights,
redress of wrongs, and an articulation of notions of responsibility. 64
Third, academics have sucked much of the law out of tort, leaving
institutional actors, particularly judges, with a diminished sense of
professional self when confronting tort suits. Many judges seem to
view tort cases as presenting a simple, non-law-governed choice:
permit the jury to do "flabby equit[y]," 65 or deny liability as a matter of
law in the name of "public policy."
Intellectual history suggests that the respective status of law's
various subdisciplines wax and wane. About seventy-five years ago,
scholars clamored for the "Death of Contract."66 Of all things, they
62. That is, at least not without the help of an army of superhuman judges. See John C. P.
Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2034, 2062-63 (1997) (identifying one such judge).
63. This last comment is arguably a species of academic NIMBY-ism, whereby a writer
working in a particular area says: "By all means the legal system should be designed to attend to
worthy goals such as distributive justice, just not my branch of the legal system." I suspect one
can find equivalent statements by scholars in most law departments. Having attacked myself, let
me defend by suggesting that, while the tort system can serve to provide sporadic advances
toward distributive justice, this sort of "ad hoc-ery" generates hostility not only to tort (hence
modern tort reform), but to the perceived beneficiaries of the tort system, i.e., the persons who
stand to benefit from a more above-the-board system of redistribution. Of course, if one is
persuaded that the choice is random redistribution through tort or no redistribution at all, then
the ad hoc solution looks more attractive.
64. My point is not that these tangibles are undesirable goals, nor that the tort system's
attainment of those goals provides no value. Rather, it is that an evaluation of the tort system
exclusively in terms of those goals is one-sided, and thus fails to account for important social
goods that tort may actually deliver.
65. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 615 (1908).
66. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (arguing that contract




fervently hoped that contract would give way to ... tort! That
particular scholarly campaign, of course, was a spectacular failure.
Contract is more important and more valued today than at any time
since the late nineteenth century. Perhaps one day the present
hostility and suspicion of tort will subside, and scholars will once
again embrace a body of law that has long empowered individuals and
preserved civil society by providing them an avenue for peacefully
seeking redress from those who can fairly be held responsible, under
law, for having wronged them.
For that to happen, however, we may need to ask less, yet
expect more, of tort. In particular, we may have to wean ourselves
from the habit of treating tort as a means of devising ad hoc solutions
to perceived social ills. By this I do not mean to say that tort ought not
to address contemporary problems-it does and it should. Rather, I
am suggesting that we must recapture the idea that tort cases are
concerned with the focused task of identifying and remedying
instances in which an actor has wronged another, as opposed to
providing localized compensation or insurance schemes, regulating
antisocial conduct for the good of society, or the like. Relatedly, we will
have to recapture a sense of tort as a body of law, rather than as an
occasion for doing whatever seems right or practical at the time.
Perhaps then tort could regain our love, or at least a grudging
recognition of its worth.
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